Rhodesian SAS period 68 70. Special forces of the armies of the world. Rhodesia under siege

In the middle of the twentieth century, the old world was bursting at the seams. The remaining colonial empires became decrepit, the Second World War finally undermined the foundations of the metropolises, and post-war poverty and devastation turned the attention of the center away from its overseas peripheries, where the independence movement had raised its head. The Laborites who came to power in Britain in 1947 gave independence to the “Pearl of the Empire” - India. A year later, Burma and Ceylon broke away from the Empire On Which the Sun Never Sets. In 1952, as a result of the revolution, the Kingdom of Egypt, which was under British influence, ceased to exist. In 1954, France lost Indochina and was stuck in Algeria, which was fighting for its independence. The colonial system on the African continent, unshakable for centuries, began to collapse - uprisings began in the colonies, pro-communist, nationalist and other organizations appeared that acted against the colonialists. The first actions of the underground showed that the colonial authorities would not be able to powerfully repel the rebels. By the 60s, it became clear that Africa was lost to the white man: constant unrest, riots, speeches and rallies became commonplace, many whites, even those born in the colonies, began to leave the continent. The African “parade of sovereignties” began: France granted independence to Mali, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and in February 1960, British Prime Minister MacMillan made a speech in Cape Town, in which he said that “the wind of change is blowing across this continent ". MacMillan wanted to avoid colonial wars like the one the French waged in Algeria, and supported speedy (if not forced) decolonization. If in the 1950s only two African colonies of England gained independence - Sudan and the Gold Coast, then by 1968 all British colonies in Africa were independent, with the exception of Southern Rhodesia. The fact is that the Prime Minister of this British protectorate, Sir Ian Douglas Smith, a Rhodesian by birth and spirit, had absolutely no intention of following the blind and sabotage line of Harold Wilson’s government - “No independence until the black majority is in power.” Smith was struck by the horrors of the neighboring colonies, which plunged into the abyss of civil strife, genocide and civil war: bloody ethnic cleansing shook Zanzibar, uprisings raged in Kenya, and civil war broke out in the former Belgian Congo. The Congo officially gained independence from the hands of King Baudouin I of Belgium on June 30, 1965, and after just 5 days of peaceful independent life, the army rebelled - black soldiers simply shot their white officer-instructors, and then, having broken into the arsenals, took to the streets and began to brutally kill everyone contract. This riot was supported by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a mentally unstable black racist. The Congo crisis, which lasted 5 years, was accompanied by massacres of the remaining whites and genocide of blacks from tribes that were not close to the established regime. Tribalism and separatism flourished in the Congo, the provinces of Katanga and South Kasai declared independence, through which crowds of frightened refugees, blacks, whites, coloreds, Christians, Muslims fled away, to the south, to independent Zambia - the former Northern Rhodesia - and to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, where the white minority still remained in power.
Refugees from Congo on the road to Zambia

On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith, after a month of intense negotiations in London that ended in complete failure, unilaterally declared the independence of the protectorate of Southern Rhodesia. From now on it became the Republic of Rhodesia with its capital in the city of Salisbury. The newly formed state abandoned the apartheid policy pursued by its southern neighbor, South Africa. In return, educational and property qualifications were introduced. England, which categorically did not accept Smith’s decision, pushed through resolutions at the UN to boycott the “rebellious colony.” The states of the socialist camp habitually branded the Smith regime as racist and there was no talk of any recognition. From the very first days of international isolation, Rhodesia began to come under attack, both within the country and abroad. Terrorists from the groups ZANLA Robert Mugabe, ZIPRA Joshua Nkomo, as well as several others, carried out attacks from the territory of neighboring states - Portuguese East Africa (future Mozambique), Botswana and Zambia - on farms and border villages, slaughtering all living things. The farther, the more the situation worsened - terrorist attacks became more and more bold and bloody


Ian Smith leaves London after negotiations for Rhodesian independence fail. October 10, 1965

The Rhodesian War, or the Bush War as it is also called, can be traced back to April 3, 1966, when a group of ZANLA militants entered Rhodesia to carry out a series of terrorist attacks, but on April 28 the terrorists were tracked down by the British South African Police ( British South-African Police, BSAP) and destroyed, and the police themselves suffered losses.

Peugeot 404 BSAP on the streets of Salisbury

This battle showed official Salisbury that the army must fight the terrorists who started Chimurenga - the “war of liberation”. And although the country’s army units - the Rhodesian Regiment, the Rhodesian African Rifles and others - were well prepared, they could not stop such attacks using conventional methods of warfare. Then the country's leadership had the idea to create a detachment to wage “unconventional warfare,” or, more precisely, one of its methods - the use of so-called “pseudo-terrorist” groups that could penetrate the territory occupied by the rebels, deliver quick merciless strikes, and then immediately retreat back to Rhodesia. There was no problem of illegal border crossing in the modern sense - the borders existed only on paper, sometimes they were fenced with a chain-link fence, there were no border outposts or patrols, which would have been beneficial for such special units.

Border between Zambia and Rhodesia at the Zambezi Bridge at Victoria Falls

It must be said that the detachment conceived by the Rhodesian military command did not arise out of nowhere: quite recently, back during the protectorate, the British SAS acted against the Mau Mau rebels in Kenya in similar groups, and in Rhodesia itself similar special detachments also gathered from time to time. This was carried out by soldiers of the Rhodesian SAS, the Special Branch of the Rhodesian Police (Special Branch) and the Criminal Investigation Department. Joint training, as well as conclusions from some of the operations carried out, led to the creation of a special pathfinder course. During the course, the Tracking Combat Unit emerged. Pseudo-terrorists began to eliminate and capture real terrorists. Some of them were converted, accepted into the Rhodesian Armed Forces and actively fought against their former comrades. However, these units were subordinate to different departments and did not operate on a permanent basis, therefore, in the current emergency situation, a special detachment was urgently needed, controlled by one department, powerful and well-trained, like army units. As a result, Prime Minister Smith signed a directive, which brought into being such a combat unit. The detachment was directly subordinate to the CRO - Central Intelligence Organization, and the execution of tasks was personally supervised by the Commander-in-Chief of the Rhodesian Armed Forces, Major General Peter Walls. The regiment became a joint product of the army and the Special Forces - brawn and brains. The detachment was named in honor of Frederick Courtney Selous, a legendary hunter, officer, explorer, who lived in Africa for 43 years of his life and died in Tanzania in 1917, fighting against the German troops of General von Lettow-Vorbeck. General Walls suggested naming the regiment in honor of the great man. Since 1973, the Selous Scouts have been part of the Rhodesian Armed Forces.
Frederick Courtney Selous

Walls appointed Ronald Reid-Daly, a former British SAS veteran who had fought in Malaya, as regimental commander. Walls knew Daly from his service in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, where Walls was his commander. Although Daly, who had served for 20 years, had retired by that time, he responded to the offer of an old friend and led the newly formed regiment.

Major General Peter Walls
Sergeant Major Ronald Reid-Daly

Ex-SAS soldier Reid-Daly, in the strictest secrecy, compiled the program and methods of work of the Scouts, and sometimes even Ian Smith did not know about this methodology, as well as about future operations. As with most elite special forces units in the world, the creation of the Scouts was met with misunderstanding by many army officers. But thanks to the support of Smith and Walls, the problems were resolved. The Scouts' uniform was not much different from the uniform of the rest of the Rhodesian army - they wore the same Rhodesian Brushstroke camouflage (Rhodesia was the first country where camouflage was introduced everywhere: it was worn not only by elite units, but also by ordinary units). The Selous Scouts did not have a dress uniform like their Light Infantry counterparts. The emblem was chosen to be an osprey - a fishing eagle, a bird found throughout Rhodesia (The osprey is also a possible prototype of one of the symbols of this country - the Bird of Zimbabwe, sculptures of which were found by British pioneers. The image of the bird can be seen on the flag of Rhodesia, and now Zimbabwe ). The headdress of the Scouts became a brown beret, similar to those worn by other special forces: the Belgian paracommandos and the Portuguese fusileiros. This beret became one of the symbols of the Selous Scouts - their enemies from ZANLA and ZIPRA called them "killers in brown berets". The regiment's motto was the Shona language phrase "Pamwe Chete!" - "Only together!"
As for the contingent of the Selous Scouts Regiment, it was a mixed unit - it included both white volunteers and blacks. Whites were selected from among the troops of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLP), SAS and other units. Later they were joined by volunteers from abroad, who, having passed the selection process, were enrolled in the detachment on the same basis as local fighters. Mostly Vietnam veterans, former soldiers of the South African army, and soldiers of the Portuguese colonial army who moved to Rhodesia after Mozambique gained independence joined the Scouts. It was the presence of foreigners in the ranks of the Rhodesian armed forces that gave rise to the USSR, USA and England to accuse Rhodesia of using mercenaries. But accusations of racism could cause sincere laughter among the Scouts: there were a majority of blacks in the regiment (70-80%). The blacks were selected from the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAS; one of the oldest military units in Rhodesia, originally a regiment of the colonial army, recruited exclusively from blacks, led by a white officer), later they were added by volunteers from the "Blackfoot" - a black unit of the Rhodesian police . Subsequently, blacks were selected immediately after the KMB. Those who did not pass the selection were sent to serve in the RAS. (In general, the term “racism” absolutely cannot be tied to the Rhodesian army, since much more blacks served there than whites).

The black sergeant sets the brains of the white recruit. Racism as it is

Former terrorists, captured and converted, often joined the ranks of the Scouts. Very few units risk recruiting former fighters, because they may not change their worldview. Such facts also occurred in the Selous Scout Regiment, which led to sad consequences. For example, in April 1975, a converted terrorist betrayed the task force, resulting in the death of seven fighters. Fortunately, this was the only case in the entire history of the Scouts.
The number of Selous Scouts for all 9 years of the detachment’s existence hardly exceeded the figure of 1,500 bayonets. It is very difficult to accurately determine the number of fighters and reservists of the units, since after the fall of Rhodesia, almost all documents related to the special forces were carefully destroyed by the Rhodesians themselves. The fact is that the rebels treated the Scouts in approximately the same way as the Red Army men treated the SS men thirty years earlier: they were fiercely hated. Veterans of the regiment hid their participation in the war, hid their uniforms or destroyed them, and often fled from their homeland, which had just been renamed Zimbabwe, to South Africa or even from Africa. The fate of the discovered Scouts was unenviable - they were simply killed, and if the Scout was a black man... That is why most of the archives of the Selous Scouts, CRO, Rhodesian SAS were either hidden and taken out of the country, or destroyed in the last days of the existence of Rhodesia.

During the formation and preparation, Reid-Daly encountered one problem. Being a former SAS soldier himself, he perfectly understood what was needed to train a special forces soldier. But in the case of the Scouts, another factor came into play - the Scout was required to be able to work in a team consisting of Europeans, Africans and former terrorists. All-round fighters were required, capable of working both in a team and individually and possessing the necessary qualities. Recruitment was carried out through notification of the Rhodesian army and police units. Due to the secrecy of the Scouts, candidates were not given any details; they were only offered to serve in a sabotage unit that performed special tasks. At first the number of volunteers was small. This was explained by the fact that the Scouts were not interested in the “past life” of the candidate, his position, achievements and merits - absolutely everything had to be started from scratch. Lieutenant Colonel Reid-Daly: "We strip a man of all his rights when he comes to us. We strip him of his past. We create him anew. It may not be humane, but it is the best way to raise a first-class soldier." In the mid-70s, the government slightly lifted the veil of secrecy over the regiment and the number of volunteers increased, and with it the competition. If a volunteer expressed a desire to join the ranks, he had to report to Camp Inkomo (in 1977 the camp was renamed Camp Andre Rabie, in honor of a pathfinder sergeant who served with TCU and died in September 1973), located 40 km from the capital of Rhodesia, Salisbury, not far from Darwendale, where the Scout Regiment was located. Actually, that’s where the preparation began. There, in Inkomo, there was also an airfield capable of receiving Douglas Dakota transport aircraft. This airfield was often used by the army, so the presence of a military unit nearby did not bother anyone. The actual training of the Scouts took place in the most remote part of the Rhodesian bush - in the Wafa-Wafa camp in Western Mashonaland, in one of the most picturesque corners of the Zambezi River valley, on the shores of Lake Kariba. The name comes from the words in the Shona language "wafa wasara" - "who died, died, who remained, remained." The camp was a very original object. Firstly, there was no civilization for many miles around - no farms, no roads, and prides of lions and herds of elephants and antelopes roamed the area. Secondly, unlike training camps in other countries, there was absolutely no infrastructure. There were no barracks or tents in the camp - only a few primitive basha (huts) - and nothing more. It was in them that the cadets had to live. Next to the huts there was a small area of ​​trampled earth with a pile of smoked stones and coals - this was the kitchen. A small dugout in the ravine was the office of the base engineers; the area cleared of grass was a shooting range. Upon arrival here, all hell began for the cadets.
The qualifying course at the Wafa-Wafa camp was designed for approximately 18 days and throughout this period the candidates, in the literal sense, felt the meaning of the name of the camp. Here were all the “delights” of harsh army drill and African flavor. The food in the camp was provided in a very original way - there was none at all. Of course, rations were issued - approximately one sixth of the army rations, but mostly the candidates obtained their own food. The menu was especially “refined” - it included snakes, frogs, and lizards. Candidates must be able to start a fire without matches and be able to catch game by making a bark snare (gusi tambo). A real feast was considered a dinner at which the cadets could eat a baboon caught by cunning. To satisfy their constant hunger, candidates catch small animals - grasshoppers and lizards. All this took place against the backdrop of enormous physical and psychological stress - we should not forget that among them, the volunteers, there are experienced, battle-hardened veterans, who, however, after a few days break down and refuse further tests. During the selection course, each candidate is brought to a state that an ordinary person cannot bear. In fact, the candidate is deprived of his human appearance, forcing him to live on pasture.

Candidates for the Wafa-Wafa camp carry a dead baboon. This monkey's liver was eaten raw

The first five days of the program followed the following schedule. The candidates were woken up just before dawn and until 7 a.m. they were engaged in physical training - running or exercising. This was followed by verification and immediately followed by combat training: handling weapons and shooting. They shot at everything, sparing no ammo: with both hands, with automatic weapons, with pistols, aimless shooting.
For the first five days, the cadets were not given any food - absolutely nothing. The cadets ate what they could get in the bush - edible berries, wild spinach, roots, small birds or rodents. But getting this food was also problematic - free time was needed, but the candidates did not have it.
As a rule, it was on these days that the largest screening of candidates occurred - about forty people dropped out. The cadets were constantly kept in the dark about the class schedule - this was done deliberately; if a person wanted to quit, he was not prevented. After the first five days, candidates began to be given food - in limited quantities. At the same time, the instructors encouraged the cadets' initiatives to obtain edible material in the bush. True, killing large animals was strictly prohibited.
After fourteen days, which the candidates lived under conditions of severe stress and constant hunger, a three-day “march to exhaustion” followed. The distance was usually chosen by the instructors taking into account the terrain, but was always within 90 - 100 kilometers. Each candidate was given a 30-kilogram backpack with cobblestones. Backpacks were specially filled with stones - the effect was designed to make the candidate constantly remember that he was carrying a meaningless and useless load, which reduced his fighting spirit. In addition, the cadet naturally carried his weapons and equipment. So the total useful - or rather useless weight - of each cadet was from 35 to 40 kilograms. For all three days of the march, the cadets were given a 125-gram can of meat and a 250-gram bag of corn grits.
The last 20 kilometers of the march turned into a forced march: alternating running and rapid walking.


Scout fills a flask

Already during this selection, candidates acquired skills that could help them adapt to the conditions in which they would have to fight. They were taught things that would make a normal person sick - for example, to replenish dehydration, the cadets learned to drink the liquid contained in the stomach of a killed animal, they could eat rotten wormy meat, etc. They were taught how to get water in the arid savannah, how to properly hunt large animals, how to butcher and cook dead animals, identify poisonous plants, and know how to use plants to provide medical care. Among the many tests, for example, there was this one: the candidate was left in the bush, given a rifle, 20 cartridges, a match and a raw egg. Weapons were given in case of attack by predators. The next morning the candidate had to present a hard-boiled egg. No one was interested in how he would achieve this.
When teaching hunting, candidates were forbidden to use firearms, since shots could attract the enemy or scare away animals. They were trained to catch animals, including predators, using various traps and tricks. Fires were allowed to be lit only dry (without smoke), in specially dug pits. The entire course was structured in such a way that those few who successfully completed it already had the necessary knowledge and skills. Reid-Daley himself spoke best about the selection procedure: “I think today in most armies in the world I would simply not be allowed to carry out such a selection. They would have the idea that I want to kill people who want to join us. We can agree with In this way, the conditions in which candidates are selected and trained are very similar to the conditions in a prisoner of war camp. We give them extreme physical and psychological stress, and this allows us to leave the strongest. Almost any person can be trained to overcome physical stress, but not everyone can overcome it themselves. ". The commander's words are confirmed by statistics. Of those who started the selection process, no more than 10% got into Scouts.
After grueling training in the Wafa-Wafa camp, there followed the so-called “dark phase” - training in conducting “pseudo-terrorist” operations. "Pseudo-terrorist" groups, along with scouts, were the main combat units of the Scouts. Scouts had to be able to act like terrorists. They were sent to a special camp, where they were taught everything that was necessary to conduct “pseudo-operations.” In addition to combat training, they had to adopt the habits of terrorists, including some features of their national mentality, such as ritual killings of animals, slang expressions in various dialects of local tribes, gait patterns and other little things. If fighters had to pose as terrorists, they had to be able and know everything that real terrorists do. Naturally, most of the Scouts operating in such groups were blacks, but they also included whites who disguised themselves as blacks in the age-old way - by applying black makeup.


White Selous Scout, made up as a black man from the Mozambican FRELIMO group

At the final stage, diving training was practiced; a significant part of the time was devoted to parachute landing, which included long jumps and landing from low and ultra-low altitudes. The total training time for a fighter, excluding previous experience, took more than 8 months. These were months of continuous intensive training, where the fighters practiced and consolidated their acquired knowledge. It is needless to mention that, in parallel with their studies, Scouts participated in hostilities - the situation in the country dictated its conditions and time was the most precious resource. The Scouts' weapons were very diverse. In part, it was similar to what the rebels fought with, sponsored by the countries of Eastern Europe, China and the DPRK: these were AK-47, RPD, RPK, RPG-7, SKS, PM, TT. Samples of Western weapons such as FN-FAL rifles were readily used; old samples of firearms taken from the warehouses of the colonial army, for example, Bren machine guns, were also in use. Of the heavy weapons, the Scouts had at their disposal 20-mm Hispano aircraft cannons, removed from De Havilland DH.100 Vampire fighters and installed on trucks, 60-mm mortars, and 12.7-mm Browning machine guns. Heavy weapons were usually used in motorized raids, since when marching on foot, mortars and machine guns became a heavy burden, so on forced marches Scouts usually relied only on their own small arms, hand grenades, light mines and, of course, explosives. Upon completion of the most difficult training course, which apparently required titanic efforts, the newcomers officially became Selous Scouts and had the right to wear a well-deserved brown beret with a silver cockade through labor, sweat and blood.
Selous Scouts Cockade


Group photo of Scouts

The tactical actions of the Selous Scouts were very varied and determined by the nature of the specific tasks in a particular operation. More often than not, the regiment operated in small groups that struck a dagger blow against superior enemy forces (often tenfold, and during Operation Öland in 1976, 72 Scouts attacked 5,000 ZANLA fighters). At the same time, the Scouts could move across the border without transport - making a difficult march through the bush, the length of which could reach hundreds of miles, groups of the regiment entered the battle on the move, quickly destroyed the enemy and retreated home to Rhodesia with the same fast march. Transport for Scouts was, rather, not so much a means of transportation, but a means of camouflage, another touch to the performance that the soldiers put on behind enemy lines. For example, the Mozambican group FRELIMO, which came to power in this ex-colony of Portugal in 1974, used Mercedes Benz Unimog 411 trucks as its main means of transportation. In Rhodesia there were no trucks of this particular model, but there were early Unimogs similar to them "The 404 and 406 models, which is why they were used by the Scouts during their raids in Mozambique

Selous Scouts returning from a raid in Mozambique

The regiment's tasks also included reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy. To monitor the identified location of terrorists, the Scouts organized an OP with a force of one to three or four people. After the data was collected and transmitted, the army or larger Scout units attacked the rebel base.
Selous Scouts often played the role of aircraft gunners. However, the main emphasis in the conduct of anti-partisan warfare was still placed on the operations of pseudo-terrorist groups. The first such detachment was formed in the regiment in January 1974. By March, two more detachments were prepared, which operated mainly in Mashonaland, an area where the Shona (or Mashona) tribes lived, and the ZANLA group was active. Each detachment was divided into groups from 10-12 to 25-30 people. Typically, 1-2 white officers led a group of 20-30 black scouts. Such groups went into the bush for many weeks, tracking down and destroying terrorists. The use of such groups provided another advantage. By posing as terrorists, Scouts could remain behind enemy lines for a long time without arousing suspicion. Very often, pseudo-terrorists were used to infiltrate the ranks of militants. Such actions were especially risky, but nothing could be done about it - risk was a necessary element of the work. Typically, the embedded Scout would relay intelligence through liaison officers or other Scouts who were secretly nearby. Then groups of Selous Scouts struck unexpectedly. If the militant camp was fortified and especially guarded, the embedded Scouts led their comrades through the posts under the guise of terrorists. A surprise attack made it possible to destroy the maximum number of militants with minimal losses. The result of such an attack was the destruction or capture of several hundred militants. Weapons and military property were seized, as well as documentation of interest to Rhodesian intelligence. Carrying out classic army operations to destroy them would require much more forces and resources, and the element of surprise would be lost when army helicopters appeared. So groups of Scouts quietly penetrated into villages where terrorist bases were located and destroyed them. Naturally, such operations required maximum organization and hard training. Often fighters from false terrorist groups came across real partisans. In this difficult situation, the Scouts had to position themselves in such a way that none of the militants they encountered would have any suspicion. So, in order to prove that they were terrorists, the Scouts simulated attacks on the properties of white farmers or on army bases. Several times, black Scouts infiltrated militant camps under the guise of escorting white prisoners. It is not difficult to guess that both the guards and the escorted were Scouts. Once in the camp, they destroyed and captured the militants.
The cauts actively interacted with other army units. These include the SAS, the RLP, and other units of the Rhodesian army and intelligence. True, due to the high level of secrecy, sometimes unpleasant complications occurred in the work of the Scouts. For example, when the Rhodesian SAS carried out an operation codenamed “Graceful” - it blew up a Zambian ferry on the Zambezi River - the Scouts almost failed the operation to evacuate their agents from the Zambezi: they were supposed to arrive in Botswana on this ferry in a few days and immediately cross the border with Rhodesia. However, the destruction of the ferry paralyzed all communication with Botswana and the Scouts had to urgently work out a new plan for the withdrawal of agents from Zambia. As a result, the scouts were transported across the Zambezi by boat under the cover of darkness right under the very noses of the Zambian border guards.
For a long time, Scout scouts monitored the movements of militants and collected data on their numbers and weapons. In this case, their excellent ability to navigate and navigate the bush played an important role. Based on intelligence obtained by the Scouts, army units carried out raids and raids on terrorist bases. Methods of countering partisans were not limited to reconnaissance and the destruction of militants. The Selous Scouts developed their own anti-ambush techniques. So, for example, when ambushed, most of the soldiers die as a result of confusion, panic and loss of control. Even during training in the “Wafa-Wafa” camp, the Scouts ensured that when ambushed, each fighter clearly knew where he should be located and where to fire. To do this, during training, mannequins were installed in places where the enemy might be located. One head and a small part of the body were visible. When simulating fire from a mock enemy, the fighters immediately took up a perimeter defense and had to throw shots at the dummy’s head. If the fighter did not hit the dummy’s head, he was immediately considered killed. Numerous trainings helped not only train fighters to competently repel an attack, but also developed reaction and accuracy when shooting. To avoid an ambush, the Scouts also used special methods of pursuit and tracking. They never followed the militants on their heels. Thanks to the ability to read tracks and navigate the terrain, the scouts skillfully avoided possible ambush sites and approached the pursued enemy from the flanks or rear. A similar persecution technique was used by GRU special forces in Chechnya.
Thus, we can safely say that the special Selous Scouts regiment created in Rhodesia is one of the most powerful, most effective and professional units of its profile in the world. The bar set by the regiment in the 70s is still high; few special forces in the world can compete with the Scouts in terms of effectiveness and professionalism. This is despite the fact that the Selous Scouts have not existed for over 35 years.

S. Kolomnin "The last battle of the Rhodesian SAS..."

Sergey KOLOMNIN

Operation Beanbag

Rhodesian last standSAS

After the disappearance of Southern Rhodesia from the political map and the formation of the state of Zimbabwe in its place, most of the Rhodesian special forces fighters (Selous Scouts, SAS and Southern Rhodesian Light Infantry) moved to South Africa and entered service in the South African armed forces. On their basis, two new reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of South African commandos were created: the 3rd, which included mainly black Selous Scouts, and the 6th, which was based on former Rhodesian Sasovites. However, these two divisions did not last long, just over a year. By mid-1981, the majority of Rhodesian special forces, having completed 12-month contracts with the South African Armed Forces, left the South African reconnaissance and sabotage formations - Reconnaissance commando (Recces). At the heart of the disagreements between the Rhodesians and South Africans was a different approach to the methodology of conducting special operations, as well as the excessive, in the opinion of the command of the South African Armed Forces, the desire of the Rhodesians for independence.

Linguistic and even religious differences also played a role. English-speaking Rhodesians were not very willing to learn the official language of the Recces, Afrikaans. And the religious beliefs of the descendants of the Boers (reformed Dutch church) were in conflict with the beliefs of the majority of Rhodesians who professed other religious movements. All this taken together eventually led some senior Recces officers to declare “the fundamentally different cultures of Rhodesian and South African special forces.”

However, before their departure, the Rhodesians were still able to “slam the door” thoroughly: through their efforts, Operation Beanbag was carried out in Mozambique, which had far-reaching consequences and caused a lot of noise in the international press.

Using the experience of the Rhodesian war

In the early 80s of the twentieth century, several educational centers and institutions of the opposition African National Congress operated in the territory of Mozambique, neighboring South Africa. In the Mozambican province of Nampula in the north of the country, for example, there was a camp where up to 150 fighters from the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, were trained. Umkhonto units, using Mozambique as a base, conducted operations in South Africa. In the capital of Mozambique, Maputo and its suburbs, the ANC owned over 30 houses and apartments, used by both the political and military structures of the ANC. Several such ANC residences in the Maputo suburb of Matole became the target of Operation Beanbeg.

The South Africans believed that in Matola, which was located 16 km from the Mozambican capital, there was “a large headquarters of the ANC and SACP (South African Communist Party - S.K.) for planning military operations in South Africa.” The commandos were to attack three targets in Matola, capture or destroy the ANC activists located there, and remove documentation of intelligence value. The headquarters of the special forces of the South African Armed Forces also counted on the capture of the leader of the South African Communist Party and member of the ANC leadership, Joe Slovo, whom the South African special services considered a colonel of the Soviet KGB. Joe Slovo was responsible in the ANC leadership for planning military operations and, having received information that Slovo periodically visited Matola, the South Africans decided to strike. The task of developing and implementing the operation was entrusted to the former Rhodesian SAS soldier, commander of the 6th Recces reconnaissance detachment, Colonel Garth Barrett.

The action was conceived as a secret raid by special forces, and not a military operation. Among the means of delivering commandos to the target were discussed: an airplane with a drop of paratroopers, a helicopter landing, a sea landing on the coast from a surface ship or a submarine. However, the latter option was rejected immediately, since the submarine could not provide the delivery of either a sufficient number of special forces or heavy weapons (machine guns, grenade launchers), which the Rhodesians insisted on. For the same reason, they refused to land an air assault group on the coast. The drop of paratroopers and a helicopter landing were also rejected as unable to ensure the secrecy of the mission.

In the end, the choice was made in favor of a convoy of trucks camouflaged as Mozambican military vehicles, which was supposed to secretly deliver special forces to the site. As the operation was entrusted to the 6th Rhodesian Recces, it was decided to rely on the wealth of experience the Selous Scouts and SAS had acquired during the Rhodesian War.

Scouts and Sasovites have already carried out similar actions in Mozambique. So in May 1976, about two dozen Rhodesians, most of them black, posing as soldiers of the government army, crossed the border with Mozambique in four trucks and went deeper into the country for more than a hundred kilometers. They secretly surrounded the base of the Zimbabwean ZANLA guerrillas, attacked and destroyed it, destroying warehouses where large quantities of weapons and ammunition were stored. In June of the same year, the Selous Scouts carried out another similar operation in Mozambique. It was codenamed "Long John". During the action, 58 special forces in four trucks camouflaged as Mozambican government army vehicles entered the city of Mapai and destroyed 19 ZANLA members and a dozen buses and trucks used by the guerrillas to transport personnel and weapons.

Therefore, the Rhodesian special forces, who formed the basis of the 6th South African reconnaissance detachment, had experience in covertly infiltrating Mozambique by car. And the South Africans had at their disposal Soviet-made GAZ and ZIL trucks, as well as armored vehicles BRDM, BTR-152 and BTR-60PB, captured during the fighting in Angola. The Mozambican army was armed with similar equipment, so it was enough to deliver several of these serviceable vehicles from Namibia from captured warehouses and put on them the identification marks of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM).

Attempt number "one"

The Rhodesians wanted every vehicle prepared for a secret raid to be equipped with heavy weapons, including automatic weapons. They were supposed to be hidden under a layer of tarpaulin in the bodies and used for fire support for special forces when storming buildings. The South Africans objected, rightly believing that there was no need for unnecessary noise for such an operation. In the end, a compromise was reached between the Rhodesians and South Africans: each truck was to be equipped with 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm Soviet-made machine guns, and some were equipped with 106 mm recoilless rifles. And yet, on one of the trucks, the former Sasovites, secretly from the Recces command, installed a 20-mm rapid-fire cannon taken from an old Rhodesian Air Force Vampire fighter.

Operation Beanbeg was commanded by the commander of the 6th reconnaissance detachment Recces, former Southern Rhodesian SAS officer Colonel Garth Barrett. In order to isolate Matola, he planned to place the so-called on all roads. stop groups dressed in Mozambican army uniforms. At the same time, barriers and signs with the words “Stop, no passage!” were to be installed at the entrance and exit from Matola. in Portuguese. Only black special forces who spoke Portuguese were included in the cordon. They were to act under the guise of Mozambican military patrols and, if necessary, use both small arms and grenade launchers. These groups were tasked with isolating Matola from the outside world. They were supposed to cut all telephone lines leading to Maputo. To give such groups mobility, they were equipped with Hercules bicycles.

At the end of November 1980, preparations for the operation were largely completed. Special forces and transport vehicles transported from Namibia concentrated 25 km from the Komatipurt border point, through which the highway connecting South Africa with Mozambique passed. A point several tens of kilometers south of the highway was chosen to cross the border. At the appointed hour, the column crossed the border through a pre-made passage in the barbed wire fences and rushed to the highway, which was more than 40 km away. The terrain was a wild African savannah, and from the very first hours of the march, the special forces began to be plagued by failures. Soviet-made vehicles delivered from Namibia were in extremely poor technical condition and broke down every now and then. To top it all off, there were communication problems. When the odometer of Colonel Barrett's commanding BRDM marked the 43rd kilometer from the border, he was informed that the two trucks had finally stopped.

Barrett contacted the command post and reported his decision to stop the operation. Just a hundred meters from the treasured highway to Matola, the column turned around and headed back. The emergency vehicles had to be towed: abandoning them on Mozambican territory meant immediately exposing the entire operation.

For the next two months, the special forces detachment and the repairmen assigned to it were engaged in restoring faulty equipment, testing communications, and training in storming and clearing buildings. It was possible to achieve a stable “internal radio network” in the column. The specialists even had to replace the Soviet radio station on the commander’s BRDM with another, “more reliable” one. The convoy also included two South African-made Samil trucks.

Disagreements are growing

Barrett continually had friction with the command of the special forces of the South African Armed Forces. The former Rhodesian Sasovo member was reproached for neglecting the technical side of the matter and arrogance. He was also accused of “excessive reliance on the Rhodesians alone.” However, Barrett managed to defend his plan for the operation, although he agreed to the inclusion of several South Africans in the team and the replacement of a number of commanders.

Finally, in the second half of January 1981, the commando reconnaissance team was ready to repeat the raid on Matola. Before the second invasion, South African intelligence services conducted thorough reconnaissance. She showed that there was no indication that the first infiltration of special forces into Mozambican territory had been uncovered. Therefore, Special Forces Headquarters gave Operation Beanbag the green light.

In the cab of each truck in the convoy there were two black drivers (primary and backup) who spoke Portuguese. The entire special forces detachment was divided into three operational groups (according to the number of objects attacked) and a mobile headquarters, which included the commanding BRDM of Colonel Barrett and a GAZ-66 truck covered with a tarpaulin, in the back of which there was a medical center and several armed soldiers. The only armored vehicle in the column, the command BRDM, was supposed to take the main blow in the event of an open clash with units of the Mozambican Armed Forces, ensuring the withdrawal of the remaining vehicles.

Team A, composed of seventeen special forces, was led by legendary Rhodesian special forces soldier Captain Robert McKenzie, a man who was "the most decorated American to serve in Rhodesia." In particular, Mackenzie was awarded the Bronze Cross "for gallantry and determination in action" and was later awarded the Silver Cross for exceptional service to Rhodesia. Robert McKenzie's team followed in a Samil truck and a Soviet GAZ-66. In addition to the task of destroying her facility, she was responsible for the safety of the convoy’s movement.

Troop B, commanded by Major Chris Steinberg, consisted of 22 men. It traveled on three Soviet trucks and was the main striking force of the sabotage detachment. Team C, led by Lieutenant Mike Rich, consisted of 17 6th Recce operators in two vehicles. Thus, the commando column ready to cross the South African border with Mozambique consisted of 68 commandos in eight trucks and one armored vehicle. All of them were dressed in camouflage uniforms of the Mozambican army, armed with assault rifles and Kalashnikov machine guns, pump-action shotguns, RPG-7 grenade launchers, hand grenades and pistols with silencers. On board the trucks with Mozambican military license plates there was the necessary supply of explosives and ammunition, and a radio station for communication between the groups and the command.

At 8 o'clock in the evening on January 29, 1981, a line of vehicles disguised as a Mozambican military transport convoy left its temporary base near Komatipurt towards the border. At 9:30 pm she reached the crossing point and, through a passage made in the barbed wire, entered the territory of Mozambique. The cars and the lead BRDM moved with their headlights off, guided by the signals from the flashlights of the foot patrols sent ahead. They conducted reconnaissance of the savannah, helping drivers choose the right road and avoid possible populated areas and minefields. At about one o'clock in the morning, Garrett's armored vehicle drove onto the asphalt road leading to Matola. The column lined up in marching order and, with headlights on, rushed towards the target. When meeting with military vehicles, the black commandos sitting behind the wheel greeted them with gestures customary in such cases or with an exclamation in Portuguese.

Before entering Matola, the cars crossed a bridge over the river. To Barrett’s surprise, the crossing was not guarded by anyone, and he decided to correct this “oversight” by setting up his own checkpoint there, disguised as soldiers of the Mozambican army. The stop group on the bridge was well armed and, if necessary, could easily hold out for some time. However, the commandos received instructions from Barrett to allow all civilian vehicles to pass freely for the time being, so as not to make too much noise for the time being. A similar checkpoint was installed on the road leaving Matola towards Maputo. The cordon should have been completely “worked” at Barrett’s command, at the moment when the first special forces began to storm their facilities.

The mobile operation headquarters, led by Barrett, who monitored the situation by radio, were located on the highway at the entrance to Matola. Before the attack, the assault groups of special forces split into threes, many of whom put steel helmets on their heads. The commanders of the troikas had fairly accurate plans of the buildings in which the ANC members were located. At Barrett's command, special forces groups began a simultaneous assault on all objects.

“Your own” or “someone else’s”?

The first attack was successful - during an attack on one of the ANC buildings, special forces managed to capture nine ANC members who were going out into the street at that moment. However, taking advantage of the shootout and the confusion that followed, seven of them managed to escape. As it turned out later, among them was the famous commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mosto Mokgabudi. While fleeing, he was wounded by a burst from a machine gun and subsequently died in a Maputo hospital.

The special forces stormed buildings in a standard “police” manner: they knocked down doors and threw grenades at the premises. In response, bursts of machine gun fire from ANC fighters guarding the buildings were heard from the darkness. According to the recollections of the Rhodesians, participants in the raid on Matola, the most difficult thing during the night assault was the identification of “friend or foe.” Most of the commandos, as well as the ANC guards, were armed with Soviet-made weapons. Therefore, it was impossible to determine by the sound whether it was our own shot or an enemy shot. In the ensuing confusion during the storming of one of the ANC houses, Captain Robert McKenzie's partners were wounded: Lieutenant Rich Stannard, Sergeant Mike Smith and Medical Sergeant Andy Johnston. Sergeant Lan Steele was killed, and Corporal Jim Parkes was mortally wounded and later died in South Africa.

Team C, under the command of Lieutenant Mike Rich, managed to enter the building undetected and kill six ANC members who did not have time to offer any resistance. The Umkhonto command later admitted that these “activists were taken by surprise and shot dead in their beds.” Group “B” had the hardest time. The object she stormed was the largest and was a two-story house with outbuildings and a garage. Expecting that this is where the most fierce resistance would be offered, the special forces drove a truck with a 106-mm recoilless rifle in the back and a 14.5-mm machine gun mounted on the cab to the entrance to the building. If the assault failed, the residence was simply supposed to be shot. However, this was not required.

The lead SWAT team, led by Captain Corrie Meerholz, immediately encountered a security guard armed with a machine gun. Apparently, mistaking the people in camouflage uniforms for soldiers of the Mozambican government army, he did not open fire. But, even realizing that there was an enemy in front of him, the taken aback guard for some reason hesitated to open fire. Then the commander of the assault group, trying to gain time, entered into negotiations with him. Only when Meerholz was convinced that the guard would not surrender did he throw a grenade into the doorway. In response, a long burst of machine gun fire was heard. Meanwhile, the second part of the assault group, taking advantage of the ongoing negotiations, surrounded the building. The first shots served as the signal for a general assault. The special forces combed room by room, destroying everyone who resisted. The wounded and stunned were taken prisoner. The found documents were carefully collected, taking small arms as trophies. In particular, an English STAN submachine gun was captured during the assault, which was later taken to the Recces headquarters and displayed there as a trophy.

According to South Africa, during the storming of the ANC residences in Matola, thirteen ANC members were killed and five were captured. According to the ANC, 15 people were killed and three activists “were kidnapped and taken to South Africa.” However, SACP leader Joe Slovo was not among them. As it turned out later, he left one of the buildings just a few hours before the assault. Among the dead was one person who had nothing to do with the ANC. This was the Portuguese engineer Jose Ramos, who worked in Mozambique under a contract with the government. He did not obey the demands of the special forces from the stop group and tried to drive his car around the barriers placed on the road. He was killed by a burst from a machine gun. In Operation Beanbeg, the special forces lost three people killed and several operators were wounded.

The entire operation to storm and seize three buildings in Matola lasted eighteen minutes, which was three minutes longer than planned. At about four o'clock in the morning, all assault groups concentrated on leaving Matola and moved along the highway in a forced march towards the border. There was no pursuit and, a few hours later, the convoy was already on the territory of South Africa.

Operation Beanbag was the last operation of the 6th Rhodesian Reconnaissance Squad of the South African Commandos. Shortly after its completion, Colonel Garth Barrett resigned. He was followed by about 60 special forces who did not want to renew their contract with the South African special forces. There were just over twenty soldiers left in the 6th Recces detachment, therefore, as part of the ongoing reform of the special forces of the South African Army, it was disbanded in May 1981, and personnel who expressed a desire to continue serving in the South African special forces were transferred to the command of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment . Following Barrett and his comrades, some of the former Selous Scouts followed. Those who wanted to stay were enlisted in the 5th Reconnaissance Regiment of the South African Armed Forces. In order not to “dissolve” among the South Africans and to preserve the memory of the Rhodesian special forces, in particular the Selous Scouts, their symbol - an image of a parachute surrounded by “wings” symbolizing the fishing eagle, a bird common throughout Southern Rhodesia - was included in the emblem 5 of the South African Special Forces Reconnaissance Regiment. The soldiers of the regiment were also given the banner and the legendary Rhodesian Selous Scouts for safekeeping.

After the death of the plane, the Rhodesian government decided to carry out a series of retaliation actions. The first of these was Operation Curious. The Rhodesians decided to demolish the rebuilt ZANLA camp in Chimoio. On the morning of September 20, Rhodesian aircraft carried out an air strike on the camp. Then the light infantry and SAS began landing. The camp was destroyed. ZANLA FRELIMO sent reinforcements to help the militants - nine T-54 tanks and four BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, but this attack was repulsed by the Rhodesians, one of the armored personnel carriers was destroyed, and at least one was captured.

According to Rhodesian data, several hundred “rebels” were killed, while the losses of the Rhodesians themselves amounted to only two people, and one was killed by friendly fire; but the Rhodesians did not take revenge on the main culprit in the death of civilians - the ZIPRA group - during this action.

The legendary Operation Gatling was carried out as revenge against ZIPRA. The RhAF, SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry took part. The main target of the operation was a terrorist base at the former white farm of Westlands, 16 kilometers northeast of Lusaka. The militants assumed that the Rhodesians would never dare attack their base so close to the Zambian capital.

Fireforce Assault

On the morning of October 19, a Rhodesian air group consisting of Hunter fighters and Canberra bombers crossed the Zambian border. She was under the command of wing-commander Chris Dixon with the call sign “Green Leader” (Green Leader, an incorrect translation from the point of view of aviation terminology, “Leader Green”) was established in the Russian tradition. The Rhodesians flew at low altitude to avoid detection by Zambian radar.

The Hunters blocked the airspace over the airbase in Mumbwa, immediately after which Dixon radioed the Lusaka airport controller.

Dixon: Lusaka CDP, this is the Green presenter. How can you hear me? KDP Lusaka, this is the Green presenter.

Lusaka CDP: Are we being called?

Dixon: Lusaka CDP, this is the Green presenter. We have a message for the base commander at Mumbwa from the Rhodesian Air Force. We are currently attacking a terrorist base at Westlands Farm. This is an attack against Rhodesian rebels, not against Zambia. Rhodesia has no claims, I repeat, has no claims, against Zambia or its security forces. Therefore, we ask you not to interfere or interfere with our attack. Please be aware that we are patrolling the airspace over your airfield and have orders to destroy any Zambian Air Force aircraft that does not heed our demands and attempts to take off. How did you understand?

Lusaka CDP: Got it.

Dixon: Got you, thank you! Be healthy!

The Zambians did not dare interfere with Rhodesia. Civil flights were also suspended. At 08:30 bombs rained down on the parade ground at Westlands Farm. Following this, the SAS and RLI troops landed according to the established scheme. During the same operation, ZIPRA camps in Mkushi and Chikumbi were attacked. According to Rhodesian data, at least 1,500 militants and Cuban instructors were killed during the operation. Also, there could well have been a certain number of civilians in the camps.

Rhodesian Hunter fighter

Meanwhile, information began to reach Rhodesian intelligence that Joshua Nkomo, with the help of Soviet, GDR and Cuban military advisers, was preparing an operation for a full-scale open invasion of Rhodesia from Zambia. This plan was chosen because Nkomo, being a representative of a national minority, could not count on winning elections in the country. To thwart Nkomo's plan, in the later stages of the war the Rhodesians decided to concentrate on operations against ZAPU-ZIPRA.

In December 1978, the Rhodesians began preparing for Operation Vodka. Her target was the ZIPRA prison camp in Mboroma, Zambia, 140 kilometers from the Rhodesian border. Rhodesian soldiers and ZIPRA "dissidents" abducted while on leave were held there. Many of them were simply deceived - they were offered a cheap higher education, but in fact they were forced to work for ZIPRA in the propaganda department. Those who did not want to work were sent to this prison.

On December 22, the Rhodesian Air Force attacked prison buildings unoccupied by prisoners. After the bombardment, a company-sized group of Selous Scouts landed in the camp. The scouts killed 18 militants. After this, the prisoners were released, most of whom were kept in inhumane conditions in underground cells.

On February 12, 1979, ZIPRA terrorists again shot down a Rhodesian passenger plane. The scheme was still the same - “Viscount”, which bore its own name “Umniati” (in honor of one of the cities) was shot down on takeoff at Kariba airport from a Soviet MANPADS. All passengers and crew flying to Salisbury (59 people in total) were killed.

The Rhodesian government ordered a retaliation operation and prepared a raid on a militant camp in the Angolan Luena. The operation was called Operation Vanity. This was Rhodesia's only intervention in the Angolan conflict.

The Luena camp housed up to 3,000 ZIPRA fighters and up to 500 Cuban and East German military advisers. The camp was covered by Angolan and Cuban fighters, and the airspace was controlled by radar stations in Angola and Zambia. Nevertheless, the Rhodesians decided to attack.

Fireforce prepare to strike

The operation was carried out on February 26, 1979. The strike group consisted of four Canberras, as well as Hunter fighters with additional fuel tanks. The group was to be accompanied by a C-47 Dakota aircraft, which performed coordination and communication functions. In the north of South-West Africa, a squadron of South African Mirages was on duty, which was supposed to provide assistance to the Rhodesians in the event of an attack by Angolan or Cuban aircraft.

At dawn, the Rhodesians took off from Victoria Falls airfield. The Canberra of the group commander, the most experienced Rhodesian pilot of the squadron commander (military rank of squadron leader) Ted Brent, had to remain on the ground. The reason for this was a problem with the aircraft's radio station. It was decided that he would take off and catch up with the group as soon as the problems were corrected.

The fighters took up a position above the Canberras, and the Dakotas below. From the airfield, the air group headed to Kazungula, a small Zambian town where the borders of Rhodesia, South West Africa, Botswana and Zambia meet. From Kazungula, the strike group's path lay northwest, to the Zambian town of Mongu. Ted Brent caught up with the group in Monga.

Mongu Airport ATC requested identification from the strike team. The Rhodesians ignored the request and turned towards Luena. At one point, the Dakota was fired upon from the ground - its pilots saw a gap, fortunately, which did not cause any damage to the aircraft. The strike group approached Luena from the west at low level - even if the radars miraculously detected the group, they would have mistaken these planes for Angolan planes coming from the coast. The camp was bombed from a height of 90 meters. There was no fire from the ground at the Rhodesian aircraft. The Rhodesians turned around and went home. As a result of the operation, the camp was destroyed, 160 militants and instructors were killed, and another 530 were wounded.

An indirect consequence of the attack was a strong quarrel between ZAPU and Zambia, since immediately after the air raid the camp was put on alert. As a result of panic and fear of a repeat attack in the evening, a Zambian training aircraft was shot down by ZIPRA militants.

At the end of March, the Rhodesian SAS carried out one of the most successful overseas operations in the history of the war - a raid on the infrastructure of the large seaport of Beira in Mozambique with the aim of crippling the FRELIMO economy. The operation was called “Milk Truck”.

SAS soldiers and their Land Rover

On the evening of March 22, South African commandos in motor boats landed a Rhodesian sabotage group disguised as FRELIMO fighters at the mouth of the Pungwe River. The group was commanded by Captain Robert Mackenzie. The RENAMO underground (they had scores to settle with the Marxists who came to power in Mozambique) led the special forces through Beira. In the city, the saboteurs split up. Mackenzie's own group was supposed to destroy a huge oil storage facility in Munhave, Captain Willis's group was supposed to destroy an oil pipeline, and then ensure an attack on the oil storage facility from the other side. Captain Cole's group was the power line, after which Cole's men had to return and reinforce Mackenzie's group.

Cole was the first to cope - the power line was mined, after which his squad returned to Mackenzie. Soon Willis mined the oil pipeline, after which he moved to his position to fire at the oil storage facility. At 11:45 p.m., Willis reported to Mackenzie that he was ready. McKenzie's group began firing at the oil tanks with RPG-7s and small arms. Willis's fighters also began shelling. Half a minute later, the first tank hit by Mackenzie exploded.

The fire began to spread quickly, flaming oil flooded everything. The FRELIMO patrols, stunned by the explosions and sea of ​​fire, chose to remain hidden from their shelters. At that moment, Mozambican anti-aircraft batteries opened fire - someone thought that the Rhodesians had carried out an air raid. When eight tanks were already on fire, the Rhodesians stopped shelling and began to retreat. By this time, the Mozambicans realized who and where the attack was coming from, and tried to fire at the Rhodesian saboteurs with anti-aircraft guns.

They failed to lower the barrels low enough, and as a result, the Rhodesian losses were insignificant (one wounded special forces soldier, one killed RENAMO underground member), but many shells landed in the slums near the oil storage facility. 18 civilians were killed. The Rhodesians managed to reach the rendezvous point with the South African saboteurs, and they were evacuated. An hour after the departure, a mine planted on the oil pipeline went off, and three hours later the power line was blown up.

Munhava continued to burn. By morning the fire had spread to gas tanks. Smoke from the fire was seen even in Rhodesian Umtali, 300 kilometers from the fire site. The fire was extinguished only after 36 hours; South African assistance had to be requested to eliminate it. The oil storage facility burned out almost completely, the oil pipeline and power lines did not work for a long time. For this operation, Mackenzie and Willis received the Rhodesian Silver Crosses, the country's second highest military award.

On April 13, 1979, Operation Graceful was carried out during which SAS fighters blew up the Kazungula ferry crossing, which was used by ZIPRA to ferry fighters, weapons and equipment to Botswana. The operation achieved its goal - the Zambian dictator Kaunda took the hint and promised Rhodesia never again to use ferries to transport militants and military equipment.

However, this operation greatly damaged the Selous Scouts - due to severed communications with Zambia, communication with the intelligence network in Zambia was lost. This was not the result of a military mess, as is often portrayed - the commander-in-chief of the Rhodesian Security Forces, Lieutenant General Walls, knew about both operations, but decided to sacrifice the intelligence network to reduce the threat from Botswana.

On April 14–15, 1979, Operation Assassination was carried out - a failed attempt on the life of ZAPU-ZIPRA leader Joshua Nkomo. On the evening of 14 April, following a report from Lusaka that Nkomo had arrived at his residence, a 25-man SAS team was ferried across the Kariba Reservoir. The special forces were disguised as Zambian military. They traveled in seven Land Rovers, painted in the colors of the Zambian army.

The column moved along a bypass road through the bush to Lusaka. Along the way we had to abandon one stuck car. They passed the only checkpoint on the bridge over the Kafue River without incident. At 02:40 the column entered Lusaka and moved towards Nkomo's residence. The lead vehicle rammed the gate, after which the Rhodesians began shelling the residence with RPG-7s. As a result of the battle, the guards were forced to retreat. Nkomo could not be destroyed - he escaped by escaping through a window behind the house. The Rhodesians retreated, taking three of their wounded, and left Lusaka at 05:00, after which they returned to Rhodesia without incident.

It is also worth mentioning the only episode when the Rhodesians clashed with Soviet military advisers. On July 26, 1979, SAS saboteurs, together with RENAMO rebels (a Rhodesian group of 11 people and 4 Mozambicans), during an operation to search for the site of a new ZANLA militant base in Chimoio, shot at a car where Soviet military advisers and a translator were traveling.

And another SAS Land Rover

The adviser to the commander of the FRELIMO motorized infantry brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Zaslavets, the adviser to the political commissar of the FRELIMO motorized infantry brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Zubenko, the adviser to the deputy technical commander of the FRELIMO motorized infantry brigade, Major Pavel Markov, the adviser to the head of the air defense of the same brigade, Major Nikolai Tarazanov, and the translator, Junior Lieutenant Dmitry Chizhov, were killed. According to Rhodesian data, there were two cars, the second one contained nine Mozambican soldiers. All fallen Soviet soldiers were posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Meanwhile, political changes were taking place in Rhodesia - the country was trying to end the stranglehold of international isolation. First, at the end of January, a new Constitution was adopted by a general referendum, and then elections were held under it. As a result of the elections, 51 seats were taken by the United African National Council, whose leader was the moderate nationalist Abel Muzorewa, 28 white seats were taken by the Rhodesian Front, Sithole’s moderate ZANU-Ndongo party took 12 seats, another 9 seats were taken by the moderate black United National Federal Party under the leadership of Chief Kayisa Ndiweni.

On June 1, 1979, Ian Smith left the post of prime minister and Henry Everard left the post of president. Abel Muzorewa became Prime Minister and Josiah Gumede became President. The country itself was renamed the Republic of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Soon, on September 1, the green-white-green flag with the coat of arms was replaced with a new one - black-red-white-green with the Bird of Zimbabwe.

For the first time in Rhodesia, a multiracial government was formed. However, whites still continued to play an important role in governing the country - they comprised almost the entire bureaucracy, the judiciary and the officer corps, and they dominated economically. Although technically all barriers to the advancement of blacks were removed, they could not replace whites overnight. Essentially, power was divided between whites and blacks.

This compromise did not satisfy the Western world. The Thatcher government did not recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Although the US Senate voted to lift sanctions on Rhodesia, President Carter's administration refused to do so.

The war against Rhodesia continued. The most serious threat at the last stage was recognized as the possibility of an open military invasion by ZIPRA with the support of Soviet military advisers. With their help, five ZIPRA motorized rifle battalions, organized along Soviet lines, were trained in Zambia and Angola. Five battalions were believed to be the minimum force needed to defeat both the Rhodesian Security Forces and the ZANLA militants.

BTR-152 ZIPRA

Regular ZIPRA troops were supposed to cross the Zambezi in two places - in the northeast with the goal of capturing the city and airfield of Kariba, and in the Victoria Falls area with the goal of capturing the city and airfield of Huanca. Immediately after the capture of the airfields, Libyan transport aviation was supposed to transfer the remaining forces by air, and after creating bridgeheads in Huanca and Cariba, three armored columns were to move to Salisbury: the first - from Huanca through Que-Que, the second - from Huanca through Caribou (to link the two bridgehead), the third - from Kariba.

After the capture of Salisbury, plans were made to establish power throughout Mashonaland. According to Nkomo and his advisers, seizing power in Matabeleland, where Nkomo’s fellow countrymen lived, would not be difficult and would be the last thing to be done. However, most of ZIPRA's resources were directed towards equipping and training regular units, which caused discontent among the guerrillas, many of whom returned to their villages. Then Nkomo decided to send soldiers of his regular units to the territory of Rhodesia, but they did not have partisan training and were easily destroyed by the Rhodesians.

Despite these problems, preparations for the invasion of Rhodesia continued. In the summer of 1979, Nkomo's regular forces began to concentrate in one of the camps in Zambia.

To prevent an invasion, the Rhodesians began a “tank bluff”. The fact is that at the beginning of 1979, the Libyan dictator Gaddafi sent ten T-55 tanks by sea to help his friend Idi Amin (they really knew each other well), who was fighting with Tanzania. While the transport was underway, the Ugandan army was defeated and Amin fled. The transport headed back.

Along the way, the captain, who does not understand politics, made a stop in Durban, South Africa. The cargo was immediately confiscated by the South African government. The South Africans kept two tanks for themselves, and donated eight to Rhodesia. The Rhodesians transported them on trailers around the country, giving the impression that the Rhodesian Armored Corps was filled to the brim with heavy armored vehicles. Officially, the appearance of the tanks was explained by their capture in Mozambique during several raids.

Rhodesians and T-55

The Rhodesian SAS carried out active sabotage activities in Zambia. The SAS destroyed bridges on the Chambeshi River, blocking communications between Zambia and Tanzania. In just three weeks in the fall of 1979, about eight bridges in Zambia were destroyed. All this caused economic damage to the country and made a possible invasion more difficult. As a result, Nkomo was persuaded to participate in the negotiation process.

Among the major foreign operations of the last period of the war, we can highlight foreign raids on ZANLA camps - operations “Urea” and “Miracle”. From September 1 to 7, Operation Urea was carried out jointly with the South Africans.

On September 1-4, Rhodesian forces totaling over 200 people crossed the border and eventually occupied an area with a radius of more than 160 km in the Mozambican province of Chigoubou. Due to bad weather, it was possible to begin active operations only on September 5. The Rhodesian SAS carried out acts of sabotage at Aldeia de Barragem and four other locations, destroying bridges and infrastructure in the province, supported by Hunter fighters and Cessna Lynx light attack aircraft.

One of the Augusta-Bell 205 helicopters was shot down during the evacuation of a wounded soldier by RPG-7 terrorists. One crew member was killed, but the pilot was saved.

On September 6, the ZANLA base at Mapai was attacked by Rhodesian Hunter fighters, then Rhodesian and South African troops were flown to the camp by helicopter. One of the South African Puma helicopters was shot down by militants using an RPG-7. 14 Rhodesian soldiers and three South African pilots were killed. The base at Mapai was very well fortified. There were heavy battles with ZANLA and FRELIMO all day. Rhodesian aircraft repeatedly carried out airstrikes against enemy positions. Finally, at sunset, the commander-in-chief of the Rhodesian army, Lieutenant General Walls, gave the order to withdraw. On September 7, all Rhodesian and South African units left Mozambique. During the operation, FRELIMO and ZANLA lost 360 people killed, the Rhodesians - 15, the South Africans - 3.

From September 21 to October 6, 1979, Operation Miracle was carried out. During its course, several ZANLA camps in Mozambique were attacked, among others, the same restored camp in Chimoio. During the operation, the Rhodesians lost seven people, of whom three died in a plane crash.

Lynx attack aircraft

September and October were difficult for Rhodesia - they lost 21 people, one Canberra bomber, a Hunter fighter and two helicopters. All aircraft were shot down by fire from the ground, except for one helicopter, which came across wires in Rhodesia itself near Umtali. South Africa lost three more people and one helicopter.

These operations became a signal for the Rhodesian leadership - they began to lose their qualitative advantage over the enemy and could not conduct foreign operations with the same effectiveness. The Mozambican government was also tired of suffering the damage caused by the Rhodesian raids. Samora Machel began to put pressure on Mugabe, demanding that he participate in the negotiations.

On December 10, negotiations began at Lancaster House. They included a British delegation led by Peter Carrington, a terrorist delegation led by Robert Mugabe and a Rhodesian delegation led by Abel Muzorewa.

The parties managed to agree that compliance with the truce, general elections and security during the transition period will be ensured by Great Britain. On 12 December 1979, British rule in Southern Rhodesia was restored. The country lost its status as a self-governing colony, and direct rule from London was introduced. The Governor of Southern Rhodesia during the transition period was Christopher Soames. Settlement agreements were signed on December 15.

Among other things, the Rhodesians managed to demand a quota of 20 seats in parliament for whites. According to the land reform, the following decision was made - the lands of the whites were to be redeemed gradually, with the consent of their owners. Britain created a fund to finance land reform from 1980 to 1990.

Elections took place in February, during which Mugabe's militants threatened voters with guns. In the elections, 57 seats were taken by Mugabe's ZANU party, another 20 seats were taken by Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and 20 "white seats" were taken by Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front.

Although there was a plan to assassinate Mugabe and launch a coordinated attack on the militant camps, the Rhodesians never decided to carry it out. On April 18, the transition period ended. The independence of the Republic of Zimbabwe was proclaimed, and Robert Mugabe became its Prime Minister.

From December 1972 to December 1979, the permanent losses of the Rhodesian Security Forces amounted to 1,361 people, while 10,450 terrorists were killed in Rhodesia alone. The number of terrorists killed in foreign raids is still unknown. Also in Rhodesia, 468 white and 7,790 black civilians died.

The history of Rhodesia is over.

The reasons for the defeat of Rhodesia were its international isolation, diplomatic pressure from outside (including its only ally), the failure of the concept of “protected villages” (if in Malaya, used against the Chinese minority, they were effective, then in Rhodesia, where they were used against the majority , they only caused anger), the limitations of their own resources and the actual unlimited resources of terrorists supplied by the great powers - the USSR and China.

What happened next to the defeated country? First of all, we need to mention the change of geographical names in 1982. Thus, the city of Salisbury was renamed Harare. Previously, the name of Harare was borne by the black town in Salisbury, the name meant “Sleepless” and hinted at the fact that life in the town did not subside even at night, including illegal life. The renaming of other cities was mainly associated with a change in the standard pronunciation - Umtali began to be called Mutare, Gwelo - Gweru, Huanki - Hwange, Inyanga - Nyanga. Apparently, this was due to the adjustment of names to the literary norm of the Shona language.

Also, after Zimbabwe declared independence, whites began to leave the country. By 1984, the number of whites in the country had more than halved to 100 thousand people.

Immediately after independence, the Zimbabwean government began reforming the army. The special forces units were disbanded immediately. The SAS soldiers themselves made sure that no materials about their activities fell into the hands of the new government - everything was taken to South Africa, even a memorial plaque with a list of dead special forces soldiers. The second "white" unit - the Rhodesian Light Infantry - was disbanded after the last parade on October 17, 1980. A core unit later trained the 1st Zimbabwe Commando Battalion.

The “Troopie” statue, which stood in Cranbourne Barracks, dedicated to the memory of the fallen soldiers of the Light Infantry, was transported first to South Africa, and after the fall of apartheid there - to the UK, to the family estate of Salisbury, where it remains to this day. A small unofficial museum of the unit was moved first to Johannesburg and later to the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol.

Monument to the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Salisbury Manor, UK

The Rhodesian infantry regiment, consisting of white and colored soldiers, was also disbanded even before the proclamation of Zimbabwe, immediately after the establishment of British rule.

Only a few Rhodesian units were retained and integrated into the Zimbabwe National Army, such as the Air Force, Artillery, Rhodesian African Rifles, Rhodesian Armored Corps and, oddly enough, the Gray Scouts, which were renamed the Riding Infantry Regiment.

Even in the process of formation, tasks were found for the young ZNA. The fact is that the Matabele ZIPRA militants refused to surrender their weapons, and the Matabele themselves refused to recognize ZANU’s victory in the elections and Mugabe’s power. Although Nkomo and many ZAPU politicians were appointed to government positions, they were careful not to give them real power.

On November 9-10, 1980, fighting took place in Bulawayo. In the western suburb of Entumbane, a firefight between ZANLA and ZIPRA militants who were in their camps lasted four hours. According to official data alone, 15 militants and 43 civilians were killed, and more than 500 people were injured. According to eyewitnesses, the death toll was much higher (“hundreds”). The battle was stopped by the Police Support Squad, mostly consisting of whites.

On February 8, 1981, ZIPRA and ZANLA exchanged fire in the town of Gwelo. 60 ZIPRA and 12 ZANLA militants were killed. To restore order, a company of Rhodesian African Rifles and armored cars were sent to the city. Troops arrived in the city late in the evening, armored cars crushing ZIPRA tents. ZIPRA resistance was crushed and about 40 people were killed. Up to half of the ZIPRA battalion was arrested, the rest fled. Over the following days, weapons and military equipment were secretly delivered to the ZIPRA camp in Entumbane. On 11 February, officers of the Rhodesian African Rifles noticed this, but the government decided not to intervene. A company of African Rifles stationed in Bulawayo prepared for defense.

On the evening of February 11, fighting began in Entumbane between ZIPRA and ZANLA using small arms and mortars. ZIPRA resistance was crushed by the Rhodesian African Rifles by 12 February. According to official data, 260 people died, some historians count over 400 dead. Government troops suffered no losses. This battle became the finest hour of the African Shooters.

Mugabe blamed ZIPRA militants for the incident, calling them "disloyal, deceived, politically motivated armed hoodlums and political dissenters" and he accused them of intent to overthrow the government. A month later, a commission was created to investigate the incident, but apparently, the results of the investigation did not satisfy Mugabe, and the commission was dissolved.

The government decided to reduce the estimated strength of the ZNA to 30 thousand people and demobilize all ZANLA and ZIPRA militants that had not yet been integrated into the ZNA. Joshua Nkomo personally ordered his troops to disarm. In August 1981, North Korean instructors were invited to Zimbabwe to train troops. Nkomo accused Mugabe of creating a “separate army”, divorced from the national one, and of seeking to establish a one-party dictatorship.

Rhodesian veterans today

In February 1982, Mugabe announced that huge ZAPU weapons caches had been found and accused the Matabeles of plotting a coup. He compared Nkomo's presence in government to the presence of a cobra in the house, after which he immediately fired him.

Trained by the North Koreans, the 5th Brigade was deployed to Matabeleland by December 1982. Thus began “Gukurahundi” (from the Shona language - the first rain that washes away the straw before the spring rains) - a punitive operation in Matabeleland. Nkomo fled the country and returned only in 1984.

The punitive action continued until 1988. During its course, up to 30 thousand people were killed, many were subjected to extrajudicial imprisonment and torture, and up to 100 thousand fled the country. Not only the Matabeles, but also white farmers fell under the hot hand of the punitive forces. During the six-year operation, more people died than in the entire 15 years of the Rhodesian Bush War, but the “progressive world” kept silent about it. Both respectable gentlemen in expensive suits and fashionable followers of extreme leftist movements do not like to be reminded of their mistakes. And Mugabe himself made sure that information about the atrocities of the punitive brigade of the 5th Brigade did not reach the general public. Journalists were expelled from Matabeleland. Nkomo himself accused the Mugabe government of genocide, saying that "Zimbabwe is worse now than under Smith."

It should be noted that, despite a number of murders of white farmers in Matabeleland, in general the white community of the country supported the punitive operation, fearing a Matabele rebellion and the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship by Nkomo.

In addition to this punitive operation, the ZNA took sporadic participation in the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, supporting the MPLA and FRELIMO.

In 1987, a reform was carried out, after which Mugabe, who had established his power, became the dictator of the country. The country was turned into a presidential republic, Mugabe became president. The quota for whites in parliament was abolished.

On December 22, 1987, an agreement was signed to unite the ZANU and ZAPU parties into a single party, the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). On April 18, 1988, Mugabe declared an amnesty for all ZAPU militants, and Nkomo called on them to lay down their arms. The punitive operation "Gukurahundi" was completed.

In 1990, Nkomo took the “decorative” post of vice president of Zimbabwe. Ian Smith retired from politics in 1992. His Zimbabwe Conservative Alliance party, the successor to the Rhodesian Front (called the Republican Front from 1981 to 1984), was dissolved.

In 1992 and 1995 There was a drought and famine in Zimbabwe. The famine was largely caused by land reform, which led to a sharp loss of efficiency in agricultural production, and ineffective, corrupt management of the country.

Population discontent grew. In 1998, the Zimbabwean government decided to intervene in the Second Congo War. After the ZNA was sent to support Kabila, Zimbabwe stopped receiving international economic aid. To save the already stalling economy and quell the discontent of the population, the Mugabe government decided to speed up land reform. At the same time, Britain was slow in issuing money for the redemption of lands.

Robert Mugabe next to a monument in his honor. Either the permanent president of Zimbabwe is capable of self-irony, or a specific black understanding of the art of sculpture

Joshua Nkomo died of cancer in 1999. At the same time, an economic crisis began in the country, which continues to this day. It was largely associated with the costs of the war in the DRC and huge payments from the treasury to “veterans of the liberation war.”

In 2000, the “black redistribution” began - the forced confiscation of farms from white farmers. They were handed over to black peasants, mainly Shona and Mugabe supporters. Prominent ZANU-PF members also received allotments. Large farms were divided into many small plots and distributed to peasants, which naturally led to a drop in yield. There were also violent acts against white farmers.

International sanctions were imposed against Zimbabwe for election fraud and human rights violations. This accelerated the decline of the economy, but the real reason for the deterioration of the economic situation was precisely the “black redistribution”. The fact is that although Zimbabwe's climate is excellent for agriculture, the most fertile land is of average quality at best. In the west of the country there are many mountainous and desert areas. For effective cultivation, many lands require fertilizers and knowledge of how to properly apply these fertilizers, as well as properly organized irrigation.

In addition, since the era of the Second World War, Rhodesian agriculture has been practically monocultural and focused on the production of tobacco, which requires complex drying and is the last thing chosen by ordinary peasants for cultivation.

It is not surprising that the division of 4,000 large farms into 160 thousand small ones led to the complete collapse of the agro-industrial complex, which, together with the mining industry, was the backbone of the country's economy. Many blacks who received plots abandoned their lands. Others barely managed to become self-sufficient.

Agriculture pulled all other sectors of the economy with it. In 2005, hyperinflation began in the country. The first denomination was made in August 2006 - 1,000 old Zimbabwean dollars were exchanged for 1 new one.

By August 2007, inflation had reached 7,635% per year. At the end of the year – 100,000% per year. Attempts to limit price increases through prohibitive measures yielded nothing; the Zimbabwean dollar continued to fall rapidly. In December 2007, a bill of 750 thousand dollars was introduced, in January 2008 - of 10 million dollars.

In July 2008, a 100 billion Zimbabwean dollar note was issued. At that time, inflation was 231 million%, and 50 million Zimbabwe dollars were equal to one US dollar. The price of a can of beer increased one and a half times per hour.

Hundred trillion Zimbabwean dollars

On August 1, 2008, the second denomination was carried out in the country. 10,000,000,000 old dollars were exchanged for one new one. A month later, the new dollar officially depreciated five times, but on the black market its price fell 100 times. At the beginning of November 2008, the inflation rate in Zimbabwe was 516 quintillion percent.

In November 2008, million-dollar bills reappeared. In December, $100 million and $200 million bills were issued. In December 2008, inflation reached 6.5 quinquatrigintillion%. Unemployment reached 94% and the economy completely collapsed. In 2009, another denomination was carried out.

Finally, on April 12, 2009, Zimbabwean dollars were withdrawn from circulation and replaced by US dollars, euros, South African rands, Botswanan pulas and Zambian kwachas.

Although the rise in prices was stopped, the Zimbabwean economy has not yet recovered. The majority of the population is still unemployed. The country's leadership is pinning its hopes on Chinese investment.

The sad story of a beautiful, quiet country between the great Zambezi and Limpopo rivers has come to an end.

Mugabe is now old and sick. At the top of the ZANU-PF party nomenclature, a political struggle is unfolding between the “old guerrillas” led by Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the “Team 40” led by the president’s wife Grace Mugabe. The future ruler of Zimbabwe is being determined. There are still less than 30 thousand whites living in the country, as a rule, those who have nowhere to go. This is one and a half times less than in neighboring Zambia, where the white community is about 40 thousand people. Previously, the white population of Southern Rhodesia outnumbered the white population of Northern Rhodesia by three times.

Finally, it is worth mentioning how Ian Smith’s life turned out. After leaving politics, he lived and worked on his farm near Selukwe. His wife Janet died in 1994, and his stepdaughter’s husband, the famous Rhodesian singer Clem Tolet, died in 2004. It was not until 2005 that Smith went to South Africa to undergo treatment. In 2006, his only natural son, Alec, died. This devastated Smith, who became increasingly ill and died on November 20, 2007, in a Cape Town hospital at the age of 88.

We can end this story with the words of the white African writer Wilbur Smith: “But all these people are long gone, because in Africa only the sun can count on eternal triumph.”

Rhodesian security forces resisted the onslaught of terrorists for fifteen years, from 1965 to 1979, during which time the state of Rhodesia itself was almost completely isolated. But the history of the Rhodesian army began much earlier, at the end of the 19th century - and from that time on, Rhodesians took part in almost all the wars of the British Commonwealth.

Origins: from the British South Africa Company police to the Boer War volunteers

The founding date of the Rhodesian Army can be considered October 29, 1889, when Queen Victoria granted permission to the British South Africa Company to "research and management" lands lying north of the Limpopo River. Soon the column of pioneers moved north, accompanied by five hundred former members of the Bechuanaland Frontier Police. The detachment, called the British South Africa Company Police, is considered the prototype of the Rhodesian armed forces.

Officers accompanying the column of pioneers

By 1892, the BSACP consisted of several units: the Mashonaland Cavalry, the Mashonaland Mounted Police and the Mashonaland Constables.

In 1893, a war broke out with the Matabele tribe, which required an increase in the armed forces by another thousand people. The volunteers formed several new units: the Salisbury Cavalry, the Victoria Rangers and the Raaf Rangers. Within three months of the war, the Matabele forces were completely defeated. The most heroic moment of this war was the battle of a patrol detachment of 34 people, pressed by the enemy to the Shangani River. The battle lasted all day, and by the end of it all the soldiers on the patrol were dead. The Matabele were paid tribute to their courage and buried with honors.

The last stand of the Shangani patrol

After the end of the war in December 1893, the voluntary regiments were disbanded, and from part of their personnel one regiment was formed - the Rhodesian Cavalry.

In 1895, a British uprising against Boer rule began in the Transvaal. The Rhodesians, in a patriotic outburst, staged a raid on the territory of this state. The detachment under the leadership of Dr. Jameson consisted of a small detachment of cavalry and several cannons. The forces were not equal, and Jameson and his men were captured by the Boers. As a result, the colony was left almost defenseless, which led to the uprising of the Matabele and Mashona tribes in 1896. It lasted until 1898, and it was only possible to suppress it with the participation of British units from Natal and the Cape Colony who arrived to help the besieged possession.

Soon the Rhodesian Mounted Police was formed, which in 1909 became the British South Africa Police (BSAP). This department was the basis of the Rhodesian police force until the very end of the country's existence and was disbanded only in 1980.

With the expansion of the territory, it was decided to create military units directly. In 1898, the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers were formed. It consisted of the Eastern Division, based in Salisbury, and the Western Division, based in Bulawayo.

The regiment took part in the Boer War, coming with the Mounted Police to the aid of the British during the Siege of Mafeking. At the same time, in Rhodesia itself, the Rhodesian Regiment (Rhodesia Regiment) was formed to protect its internal borders.

Southern Rhodesian Volunteers are sent to the Boer War. 1899

After the end of the Boer War, the armed forces of the colony became permanent parts of the British army, and the Southern Rhodesian Volunteer Regiment received a banner and insignia.

Rhodesian armed forces in the world wars

The Rhodesian regiment, in turn, was disbanded after the siege of Mafeking. But in 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War, it was recreated. The small colony in southern Africa was able to raise two full-fledged regiments for the British Commonwealth troops, sending 5,000 white men (which was no less than 25% of the white population of Rhodesia at that time) and 2,000 black men to the war. These regiments fought in German South-West and East Africa. They were later sent to France.

During the same period, the Rhodesian Native Regiment, consisting of Africans, was formed. After the end of the First World War, he received the distinctive "East Africa 1916–1918" insignia on his banner. These insignia would later be transferred to the Rhodesian African Rifles. The Southern Rhodesia Volunteers were disbanded in 1920, although a few rifle companies were retained in Rhodesia's main towns.

Rhodesian Regiment on the streets of Cape Town, 1914

The Defense Act, adopted in 1927, determined the need to create permanent armed forces in the colonies and dominions of the British Commonwealth. By 1939, compulsory conscription was introduced in Rhodesia, and the police (BSAP) were finally separated from the army.

In 1934 they were created Rhodesian Air Force(first as part of the Rhodesian Regiment). In 1936 they were withdrawn into a separate unit, and in 1937 the fledgling air force was given an airfield and base at Cranebourne Barracks in Salisbury. In September 1939 they began to bear the name "Southern Rhodesian Air Force", and in 1940 they were officially incorporated into the Commonwealth Air Force.

With the outbreak of World War II, there was a need to increase the armed forces. The 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), an artillery detachment, an armored vehicle detachment, and training centers at Gwelo and Umtali were created. Rhodesians served in many British units - in order not to risk extermination of all the men of the colony of military age, they were not brought together into one unit, but were distributed among different ones. Two conscript battalions were left behind to defend Rhodesian territory. A flight training center was also established at Thornhill Air Base, and almost 2,000 people trained there before the end of the war.

Air Force Training Center at Thornhill AFB

The Rhodesians fought in most of the theaters of war. In North Africa, there was a Deep Desert Reconnaissance Group, Long Range Desert Patrol - “Desert Rats”. In Burma and Indochina, Rhodesian African Rifles served with the King's African Rifles in the 22nd (East African) Independent Brigade. This unit first saw action in April 1945 and performed well in Burma.

The Rhodesians fought in artillery and tank units, as well as in commando saboteur units (the prototype of the SAS). After the war, the Rhodesian Regiment received the "Royal" prefix for its merits, which would only be removed in 1970, after the declaration of independence.

Rhodesians of the Royal Fusiliers in North Africa

Three squadrons in the Royal Air Force deserve special mention: the 237th and 266th Fighter Squadrons and the 44th Bomber Squadron, which were staffed for the most part by residents of Southern Rhodesia. They took part in the Battle of Britain, battles in North Africa and Europe. In total, 2,300 people fought in these squadrons, of whom every fifth died.

The 237th and 266th squadrons were disbanded at the end of the war, the 44th existed until 1957. It is noteworthy that Ian Douglas Smith, the future Prime Minister of Rhodesia, fought in 237 Squadron. He was shot down in the skies over Italy in 1944, but managed to get out to the Allies, crossing from Italy to France through the Alps.

Final years under the British Colonial Empire

In 1947, the Rhodesian Air Force became an independent unit. In 1952, they moved permanently to the air base at New Saruma and were renamed the Rhodesian Federation Air Force (referring to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland).

In 1948, conflict began in Malaya between communist guerrilla forces and the British government. The fighting took place mostly in the jungle, and special soldiers were required who could track down the enemy while away from their bases. In 1951, a group of Rhodesian volunteers join British forces in Malaya. They took part in operations with the Malayan Scouts and subsequently, in 1961, became C Troop of the 22nd SAS, Britain's most elite special forces unit. In 1952, Rhodesia again assisted Commonwealth forces in the Suez Canal Zone conflict.

C Troop, 22nd SAS, during the Malaya conflict, 1953

During the existence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now three independent African states - Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi), the army was completely reorganized, and each unit received the name "Rhodesia and Nyasaland". In 1955, rotating African Rifles units were sent to Malaya to replace the Northern Rhodesian Regiment. In 1961, the second purely “white” unit of Rhodesia was formed (the first was Squadron “C” SAS) - the 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian Light Infantry.

In 1964, the federation collapsed, and in 1965, Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Rhodesia from Great Britain. Naturally, this again causes changes in the army.

Rhodesia under siege

Since April 1966, militant groups began to infiltrate Rhodesia from neighboring Zambia. But the official beginning of the “War of Independence” (Bushwar, “Second Chimurenga”) is considered to be 1972 and the attack on the Altena farm in Centenary County.

The course of the war required non-standard solutions. The terrorists knew the terrain very well, worked in small groups and, if detected by security forces, disappeared into the bush. Some captured fighters from among them went over to the side of the Rhodesians, which made it possible to subsequently introduce agents and “pseudo-terrorists” into the nationalist camps. Based on this experience, a pathfinder course was created, which was taken by members of the SAS, a special unit of police and criminal investigation. As a result, the Tracking Combat Unit arose. TCU fighters tracked down the terrorists, infiltrated their structures, found out the necessary information, and then either transferred it to the special operations center, or called in the light infantry airborne forces and African riflemen, who destroyed the enemy.

Selous Scouts disguised as terrorists

In the period from 1973 to the beginning of 1977. with their help, directly or indirectly, about 1,200 of the 2,500 terrorists who entered Rhodesian territory were destroyed. The successes of the “pseudo-terrorists” were so great that in 1974 the number of TCU groups was increased to six. They were later reorganized into a special unit - the Selous Scouts.

The Selous Scouts were 70% black. It included former members of ZANLA and ZIPRA, police, African Rifles, light infantry and SAS. The fighters were taught to survive in the bush, read tracks, disguise themselves as terrorists and much more. To this day, selection for Selous Scouts is considered one of the toughest in the world - less than 10% of those who began training reached the end.

Terrorists very often hid in rugged and inaccessible terrain. To ensure greater infantry mobility, a mounted infantry unit was created - Gray's Scouts. His fighters were not cavalry in the full sense of the word, but used horses only as transport. The main tasks of the unit were patrolling, reconnaissance and pursuit of the enemy. Patrolling the territory, on an average day, Gray's scouts examined the area within a radius of 40 kilometers.

When the command of the Rhodesian armed forces realized that it was virtually useless to wage war on its territory, because... More and more terrorist detachments are penetrating across the borders with Zambia and Mozambique, it became clear that the war must be transferred to enemy territory.

Four De Havilland Vampire fighters from the 2nd Squadron of the Rhodesian Air Force in the Victoria Falls area

Since 1976, the territories of Zambia and Mozambique have held rapid raids to destroy enemy camps by the Selous Scouts, SAS, Light Infantry, Air Force and Armored Corps. So, for example, Operation Gatling was a response to the destruction of a civilian Rhodesian airliner (Vickers Viscount, flight 825, tail number 782D) on September 3, 1978. The airliner was shot down by a Strela-2 MANPADS near Lake Caribou. Eighteen people who survived the fall were killed by terrorists. In response to this, the Rhodesian Air Force carried out an unprecedented raid on Zambian territory: Air Force bombers bombed the training camps, and the troops that landed after them cleared the terrorist camps.

On February 12, 1979, another airliner (flight 827) was shot down by freedom fighters. In response to these actions, the Rhodesian Air Force conducted Operation Vanity, a raid on Angola. Having successfully bombed the training camps, the Rhodesian pilots returned to their bases without losses. Selous Scouts and the SAS raided ZIPRA headquarters in Zambia, nearly killing ZIPRA leader Joshua Nkomo in the raid.

Light infantry soldiers are loaded into a helicopter

It is worth mentioning the “mercenaries” in the Rhodesian army. As part of its units, people from all over the world fought - the French, the British, the Americans (there were especially many of them in the light infantry). However, they received the same salary as ordinary soldiers, and did not have any privileges or concessions compared to the Rhodesians. Despite their merits and titles, they were all first selected for the desired units, and then enrolled there on a general basis.

This, by the way, caused a wave of discontent among many newly arrived experienced soldiers, and they often went back without even unpacking their things. From the point of view of the international law of military conflicts, these foreign military personnel were volunteers rather than mercenaries.

End of the Rhodesian Army

Despite partial successes in waging the war, it became clear that the Rhodesians would not be able to overcome the endless stream of nationalist partisans supplied with Soviet and Chinese weapons. Economic sanctions against Rhodesia also played a role. Trade with the whole world “under the counter” in valuable minerals could not compensate for the unacceptably high costs of the war. By 1979, they reached 1 million US dollars a day, which was a very significant amount for small Rhodesia.

Foreign observers (in olive uniform) who arrived to verify the legality of the elections in Rhodesia

Peace negotiations began in 1979, during which civilians continued to die from mines and bullets. Based on their results, it was agreed that free elections would be held in the country in 1980 under the supervision of the international community.

Despite all this, the Rhodesian military prepared Operation Quartz, whose goal was to destroy the leadership of ZANLA, kill Robert Mugabe and prevent a Marxist coup in Rhodesia by force of arms. When it became clear that Mugabe had won a decisive victory in the elections, the military was forced to cancel the operation so as not to start a new round of war and to avoid unnecessary casualties.

Last parade of the Rhodesian Light Infantry

1980 marked the virtual destruction of the Rhodesian security forces. Lieutenant General Peter Walls was dismissed by the new president. Fearing reprisals from the new authorities, many white residents left Zimbabwe with their entire families.

The Selous Scouts, SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry caused the greatest hatred among the former guerrillas. Most of the Selous Scouts secretly left the country, crossing the border into South Africa and enlisting in 5 Recce (South African reconnaissance and sabotage unit). All documentation, lists of personnel and methods of training scouts were classified or destroyed by former Rhodesians.

Soldier Memorial erected in Great Britain

At 11:00 on July 25, 1980, Rhodesian light infantrymen marched along the regimental parade ground past the soldier’s monument, cast from spent cartridges, in solemn formation for the last time, greeting their fallen comrades. Lists of the dead were read out, and the battalion chaplain read a prayer. A bagpiper played "The Last Post" and wreaths were laid at the memorial and regimental colors were folded. On July 28, the statue was removed from its pedestal and transported to South Africa. She is currently based in the UK. The 1st Battalion Rhodesian Light Infantry was finally disbanded on 31 October 1980.

The SAS held a simple farewell ceremony and folded the unit's colours. However, this was not the end - they carried out Operation South of the Border. During its course, a memorial slab was taken across the border with South Africa, on which were carved the names of the operatives who died in the war against terrorists (the government that came to power, naturally, first of all began to fight the monuments of the “white regime”). This stove is now installed on the farm of one of the SAS veterans near Durban in South Africa. All documents of the unit were destroyed.

Memorial plaque of the Rhodesian SAS

The Rhodesian African riflemen held out the longest in the “whirlwind of change.” In 1980, they took part in suppressing protests by groups opposing the new government. In November 1980 and February 1981, African riflemen took part in suppressing the uprisings. While the unit of the new army of Zimbabwe (5th brigade) was formed and trained under the guidance of North Korean instructors, in fact the only fighting force in the country remained the Rhodesian African riflemen.

By December 1981, the situation in the army and the nature of the orders given to it had deteriorated so much that most of the old soldiers simply deserted. On December 31, 1981, an order was given for the inclusion of the remnants of the Rhodesian African Rifles into the newly created units of the Zimbabwe Army.

Emblem of the Rhodesian Army

This was the end of the history of the armed forces of Rhodesia, a country that supported Great Britain throughout its history and was then betrayed by it. The Rhodesian army, which fought even when the whole world was against it, was never defeated by force of arms. Politicians put an end to it.

Literature:

• Blog of Sergei Karamaev (http://tiomkin.livejournal.com)
• Brief History of the Rhodesian Army by R. Allport
• OSPREY MEN AT ARMS No. 018 – Modern African Wars (I): Rhodesia 1965–1980